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RELIGIOUS LUCK
Linda Zagzebski

Recently the problem of moral luck identified by Joel Feinberg, Thomas
Nagel, and Bernard Williams has captured a lot of attention in ethics. In this
paper I argue that the problem exists for Christian moral theory and practice
as well, and that the problem is magnified by certain aspects of Christian
theology, including the doctrines of grace and of an eternal heaven and hell.
I then consider five solutions to the problem, all of which involve modifying
in one way or another either traditional Christian doctrines or common views
on the grounds for moral evaluation.

I. Introduction
Moral luck occurs when a person's degree of moral responsibility for an act
or a personal trait goes beyond the degree to which she controls it. If it exists,
people are the proper objects of moral evaluation, including praise and blame,
reward and punishment, because of something that is partly due to luck.
Thomas Nagel has argued that this is not a mistake in our moral practices,
but is a consequence of the right way of looking at morality. We cannot
eliminate luck without destroying moral evaluation altogether. Nonetheless,
most of us find moral luck repulsive- even, perhaps, incoherent. Surely it
must be the case that each of us has an equal chance at the one thing that
matters most: our moral worth. While we must put up with elements of chance
and fortune in the other aspects of our lives, how could this happen in morality? In fact, we could make a strong case for the view that a primary
distinguishing feature of moral evaluation as opposed to other sorts of evaluation is that it is completely luck-free. And not only is it luck-free, it compensates for the prevalence of luck in the other areas of our lives. There is,
then, a kind of ultimate cosmic justice. Nevertheless, Thomas Nagel, Bernard
Williams, Joel Feinberg, and others have persuasively argued that morality
is permeated with luck. If they are right, morality is threatened with inconsistency.
In this paper I will focus on the problems of moral luck identified by Nagel
and Feinberg and will argue that they exist for Christian moral practice and
Christian moral theories as well. In addition, the problem of luck for the
Christian is worsened by several elements not found in secular morality,
including the traditional doctrine of grace and the doctrine of an eternal
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heaven and hell. Historical disputes over these doctrines within Christianity
do not go to the heart of the luck problem. At one time the dispute took the
form of the controversy over predestination vs. free will. Nowadays it is more
usual for the focus to be on the question of whether an eternal hell is consistent with divine justice, mercy, goodness, or love. The problem I am raising,
however, is not a problem about free will or the coherence of the divine
attributes, but is a problem internal to the concepts of moral responsibility,
reward, and punishment as understood by the Christian. I will argue that while
secular morality has no resources to handle moral luck, Christianity can do
so either by eliminating it or by renduring it innocuous. I will consider five
ways this might be done, none of which are options outside of Christian
theology, but each of which raises problems of its own.

II. The Case for Moral Luck
In well-known papers by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel the existence
of moral luck has been identified and illustrated with numerous examples. l
Nagel argues that there are three main sources of moral luck: luck in consequences, luck in circumstances, and luck in constitution, the last of which
might more properly be called luck in traits of character. Together they make
luck so pervasive that it contaminates virtually every type of moral theory as
well as common moral practice.
Consider first luck in consequences. The idea here is that the outcome of
a person's act affects his degree of fault even though the way things turn out
is to some extent beyond his control. To take one of Nagel's examples:
If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to the sidewalk,
he can count himself morally luck if there are no pedestrians in his path. If
there were, he would be to blame for their deaths, and would probably be
prosecuted for manslaughter. But if he hurts no one, although his recklessness
is exactly the same, he is guilty of a far less serious legal offense and will
certainly reproach himself and be reproached by others much less severely.2

Although the example is a legal one, it is clear in the subsequent discussion
that Nagel thinks that the degree of moral responsibility differs in the two
cases even though the degree of control by the agent is the same.
Luck in consequences is the category given the most attention by both
Williams and Nagel, but it is also the most vulnerable to objection. 3 I will
therefore not make any of my claims in this paper depend upon there being
luck of this type. Let us then consider the Kantian move of focusing moral
assessment exclusively on the internal sphere of intentions or acts of will.
What accrues to our discredit is not literally what we do, on this approach,
but only those mental acts by which we do it.
Will this move eliminate the problem of moral luck? Unfortunately, it will
not. For one thing, a person forms intentions only when the occasion arises,
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but the arising of the occasion is the result of circumstances largely beyond
the agent's control. Again, to take one of Nagel's examples:
Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically
by opposing the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and
most of them are culpable for having failed the test. But it is a test to which
the citizens of other countries were not subjected, with the result that even
if they, or some of them, would have behaved as badly as the Germans in
like circumstances, they simply did not and therefore are not similarly culpable. 4

In an earlier paper, Joel Feinberg made the same point that responsibility
for one's inner states can in some circumstances be wholly a matter of luck. 5
He considers the case of Hotspur, the unfortunate slapper of Hemo, an equally
unfortunate hemophiliac, who dies as the result of Hotspur's slap.
Imagine that we have photographed the whole episode and are now able to
project the film in such very slow motion that we can observe every stage of
Hotspur's action and (constructively) even the "inner" anticipatory stages ....
At each of these cinematographic stages there is some state of affairs for
which we might hold Hotspur responsible. We can also conceive of a third
party, call him Witwood, who is in all relevant respects exactly like Hotspur
but who, through luck, would have escaped responsibility at each stage, were
he in Hotspur's shoes. We can imagine, for example, that had Witwood caused
Hemo's mouth to hemorrhage, Hemo's life would have been saved by some
new drug; or at an earlier stage, instead of becoming responsible for Hemo's
cut mouth, Witwood lands only a glancing blow which does not cut; or again,
instead of becoming responsible for the painful impact of hand on face,
Witwwod swings at a ducking Hemo and misses altogether. Though similar
in his intentions and deeds to Hotspur, Witwood escapes responsibility
through luck.
The same good fortune is possible at earlier "internal" stages. For example,
at the stage when Hotspur would begin to burn with rage, a speck of dust
throws Witwood into a sneezing fit, preventing any rage from arising. He can
no more be responsible for a feeling he did not have than for a death that did
not happen. Similarly, at the point when Hotspur would be right on the verge
of forming his intention, Witwood is distracted at just that instant by a loud
noise. By the time the noise subsides, Witwood's blood has cooled, and he
forms no intention to slap Hemo. Hotspur, then, is responsible- I suppose
some would say "morally" responsible- for his intention, whereas Witwood,
who but for an accidental intrusion on his attention would have formed the
same intention, luckily escapes responsibility. 6

Since the introduction of Witwood to the analysis of Hotspur is just a
colorful way of talking about what Hotspur himself might have done if he
had not been unlucky, the objection might be raised that the claim of moral
luck in circumstances rests on the questionable view that there are true counterfactuals of freedom of the form: In circumstances C Hotspur would have
done X. But, in fact, the case rests on no such problematic counterfactuals.
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It is not necessary that the circumstances in which Hotspur would not have

struck Hemo are precisely specifiable, even in principle. All that is required
is that there are some counterfactual circumstances (perhaps with the proviso
that these circumstances not be too far removed from the actual ones) in
which Hotspur does not strike Hemo, and that it is beyond Hotspur's control
that these circumstances do not obtain; and surely that much is true.
The natural response at this point of the story of Hotspur and Witwood is
to go back even further, before the situation arose. As Feinberg describes the
case, Hotspur and Witwood have the same character traits relevant to the type
of situation described. They are equally irascible or sensitive about personal
remarks, and so if we make the primary focus of moral judgment character
traits themselves. Hotspur and Witwood are equally at fault and so Hotspur
neither benefits nor suffers from moral luck arising from actual intentions or
feelings. Feinberg does not pursue this line, but Nagel considers it briefly
with examples of the traits of envy and conceit and claims that they also are
not impervious to luck. As Nagel describes these cases, they are most naturally understood as qualities of temperament rather than vices, but considerations on the nature of virtues and vices show them to be heavily affected by
luck as well, at least they are on a classical Aristotelian theory. To Aristotle
traits of character are not inborn, but are habits acquired through imitation
of others. The character of the persons to which one is exposed while young
is clearly outside a person's control, yet it is the major factor in the acquisition
of moral virtues and vices. So even if the primary moral responsibility of
persons is for enduring traits of character rather than for intentions, acts, or
their consequences, moral luck still exists.
A thorough examination of the problem of moral luck would have to give
careful attention to the development of our concepts of fault and responsibility and the purpose of rewards and punishments, but my conclusion at this
stage is that moral luck does exist and is a flaw in the institution of morality
as we know it. While I do not maintain that luck exists in all of Nagel's
categories, there is surely luck in whatever it is people are morally evaluated
for since every suggestion on what that is is covered by one of Nagel's or
Feinberg's categories. The range of luck is wide enough to cover just about
every object of moral evaluation in every known theory: consequences, acts,
intentions, dispositions, character traits. Even worse, there is no reason to
think that a new theory would help since the problem is pervasive in the
practice of morality as we know it, not just in its theoretical formulations.
I maintain, then, that moral luck exists, but I also maintain that the Kantian
intuition that morality ought to be free of luck is justified. So while we cannot
escape moral luck, we ought to devise moral practices and ways of theorizing
that minimize it. What Nagel and Feinberg do not say is that the degree of
moral luck is less for some forms of moral evaluation than for others. If we
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extend Feinberg's imaginary exercise and trace a line backwards from the
consequences of an act, to the physical act itself, to the intention to perform
the act, to the psychic states out of which the intention is formed, to the
enduring character traits from which the act arises, we find that the farther
back we go, the less luck there is. This is because each later point of assessment includes all the luck of the previous points as well as some others. There
is a cumulative effect in moral luck. So in Feinberg's example of Hotspur,
his degree of luck in killing Hemo includes the luck involved in the personal
qualities that led him to become violent, aggravated by the degree of luck in
the circumstances in which the intention to commit the act was formed,
aggravated by the degree of luck in the circumstances in which death follows
the act. The class of theories which focus moral evaluation on intentions are
therefore preferable to those which focus on consequences in that they allow
less room for luck. Even better than intention-based theories are virtue-based
theories. At least with respect to the problem of luck, virtue theories have the
advantage.
Nagel is rather sanguine about the existence of moral luck. It is something
we will have to live with it, he says; we really do not have any choice.
Morality may be defective, but we're stuck with it. Notice that this is a
reasonable response only if we think of morality as having finite significance.
While Nagel does not explicitly make such an assumption, it is clear that a
major part of the reason he is willing to accept moral luck is that he assumes
it is closely tied to human intuitions, purposes, and practices, the defects of
which are so obvious that it really should not be any surprise that the defects
extend to the ground of moral evaluation itself.
Feinberg's conclusion following his discussion of the case of Hotspur and
Witwood is somewhat different from Nagel's, but equally interesting. Moral
responsibility is a matter about which we are all confused, Feinberg concludes, and no particular philosopher or school is especially gUilty of this
confusion. The problem is not only that our degree of responsibility exceeds
our degree of control, as Nagel maintains, but that our moral responsibility
is indeterminate. even in principle.

III. The Luck of the Christian
Christian ethics has some of the same problems of luck that face secular
ethics. Perhaps Christian moral theorists are less inclined to hold a person
responsible for consequences beyond those she can control, and to that extent
Christian ethics does not face the most severe of the three types of moral luck
identified by Nagel. Still, the range of objects of moral evaluation within
Christian moral theories are all things that Nagel and Feinberg have demonstrated to my satisfaction to possess a degree of luck. To the extent that there
is luck in one's moral responsibility for one's virtues and vices, the circum-
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stances in which one forms one's intentions, and the resulting acts themselves, to that extent the Christian faces moralluck. 7 As the Christian understands morality, then, we are faced at least with luck in circumstances and in
traits of character.
But Christian ethics differs from secular ethics in ways that make the matter
of luck especially problematic. In the first place, Christian moral theory
replaces the concept of moral wrongdoing by the concept of sin, an offense
against God, and the concept of an abstract state of moral worth which may
or may not be determinable is replaced by the concept of one's moral state
as judged by God. And presumably that should be determinable. Furthermore,
there is less room for the acceptance of luck in Christian ethics than in ethics
as conceived by Nagel since to the Christian morality is not simply an institution dependent upon the finite concerns of limited and defective humans.
What's more, Kantian intuitions are strong in the Christian tradition and it
can be plausibly argued that Kant was heavily influenced by Christian sensibilities in devising his idea that moral worth is strictly under our control.
In fact, the precursor to Kant's idea exists in St. Augustine's De Libero
Arbitrio. There Augustine says that we are contented only if we possess the
"good will" (bona voluntas), which is the only good fully within our power.
and of which we cannot be deprived by worldy circumstances. R
To make matters worse, traditional Christianity includes two doctrines
which, on the face of it. magnify the problem of luck to infinity. These are
the doctrines of grace and of an eternal heaven and hell.
Consider first the doctrine of grace. On all accounts grace is necessary for
salvation and is an unearned gift of God. While accounts of grace within
Christianity differ with respect to the question of how much our efforts can
affect the reception of grace, no one suggests that it is wholly under our
control. There is, then, religious luck. What's more, religious luck magnifies
moral luck, at least in the theology of Aquinas, since he says that not only
are the greatest of the virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, infused by grace, but
no merit accrues to our possession of the ordinary "natural" virtues such as
kindness, justice, and courage without the action of grace. And Christian
Charity is the supreme virtue without which no other trait we possess nor act
we perform gives us any merit.
Most serious of all, the reward or punishment to which a life of grace or
the lack of it leads is an eternal heaven or hell. This element of Christian
teaching multiplies the effects of moral luck and the luck of grace to infinity.
I will not speculate here on the nature of eternity; eternal reward or punishment may not be infinite in duration. Nonetheless, it must be the case that an
eternal reward is infinitely greater than an earthly reward and an eternal
punishment is infinitely greater than an earthly punishment. A person controls
her individual choices and acts and the series of choices and acts which make
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up her life only up to a point, yet her reward or punishment is infinite. This
means that even in the best case, one in which we can assume that the
cumulative luck in a person's life from natural qualities, circumstances, and
consequences is fairly small, since an infinite reward or punishment is at
stake, the effects of even a small degree of luck become infinite.
Religious luck is not strictly parallel to moral luck, however. Moral luck
occurs when the rewards or punishments a person deserves are partially a
function of matters beyond the person's control. In the case of religious luck,
however, Christian doctrine maintains that everyone deserves the worst punishment, namely, eternal damnation. So religious luck is not luck in what one
deserves, although it is luck in what one gets after the final judgment, and
that at least appears to be reward and punishment. Two people may be in
exactly the same position as far as their control is concerned, yet one is saved
and the other is damned. 9 So the fact that moral luck is a matter of desert and
religious luck is not hides a more fundamental similarity. Both moral and
religious luck involve an inequality in the way persons are treated by the
institution of morality itself.
A more important way that religious luck is disanalogous with moral luck
is that most Christian theologians maintain that grace is offered in such
abundance that everyone receives more than is sufficient for salvation. In
fact, on some accounts everyone receives many times a sufficiency. This
changes the analogy with the cases of moral luck in circumstances. A typical
example of the latter is a situation in which two persons, David and Mark,
appear at the scene of a burning house. David gets there first and saves a
child from the fire. Mark would have done the same thing had he arrived on
time, but as it is, David is the moral hero instead. Although Mark did not
even have the opportunity to save the child, David both gets and deserves
more praise than Mark.
To make this case analogous to the case of religious luck due to the circumstances of grace, its description must be amended. We would have to say
that both David and Mark have numerous chances to save a child from a
burning house or acts of a similar nature, and all either one of them has to
do to receive the big reward is to perform one such act of heroism. David
does have more chances than Mark, but as long as Mark has opportunities in
abundance, the inequality between him and David loses some of its sting.
This suggests that the greater the opportunities for even the least religiously
lucky person, the less problematic the inequality between his luck and someone else's appears to US.lO Nonetheless, the issue of the inequality remains,
and that is the heart of the problem of luck as proposed by Nagel.
Historical disputes within Christian theology over predestination vs. free
will and over the precise nature of Faith and the way grace works were partly
disputes about luck, but not in the sense we are considering. All sides agreed
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that no one earns or deserves grace, and so grace is obviously a matter of
luck in the sense that it is gratuitous. Still, there were disputes over the
relationship between human effort, will, or action and the reception of grace.
There may have been less room for luck in the Catholic position than in the
Calvinist position, but all the traditional positions included a substantial
degree of luck in the sense we are addressing here, even the Pelagian heresy.
It should be clear from Nagel's discussion that the issue is not one about
incompatibilist free will. If there is no incompatibiIist free will, then our
moral acts, choices, and traits of character are wholly a matter of luck. If
there is incompatibilist free will, then they are only partly a matter of luck.
This is because the claim that there is incompatibilist free will is merely the
claim that past circumstances do not completely determine the choice that a
person makes; no one disputes that past circumstances, including many beyond a person's control, strongly influence a person's choice. So no matter
which way we go on free will, there is luck. This luck contaminates any
account of moral worth, including accounts of grace. If grace is both offered
and received without any control by the recipient, then the luck of it is
overwhelming and obvious. If the recipient controls either its offer or its
acceptance to any extent through a free choice, the luck is still present in
abundance, only less obviously so.
As with the doctrine of grace, traditional discussions of heaven and hell
have tended to be about different problems from the one I am addressing.
Even in contemporary philosophical theology discussions on the existence of
hell usually approach it from the point of view of its consistency with other
divine attributes: divine justice (Peter Geach, George Schlesinger), divine
goodness (John Hick, Eleonore Stump, Richard Swinburne), and divine love
(Thomas Talbott).11 The question that concerns me here is not a problem for
the divine attributes, but a problem for the Christian conception of morality
itself. If there is moral luck and that is a flaw in morality, we cannot so
blithely say as Nagel does that that is just something we will have to live
with. The stakes are infinitely greater than those assumed by Nagel.

IV. What Makes Luck a Problem?
On the face of it the problem of luck in Christian moral theology is far greater,
even infinitely greater than it is for secular moral practice and theory. But on
the face of it Christian theology with its doctrines of an omniscient and
provident God also has the resources to handle conceptual difficulties which
would be impossible for a theory without such a deity. God can mend problems in moral evaluation that nothing can mend in ordinary moral practice.
But before turning to the ways God can alleviate the problem of luck, let us
look more closely at exactly what makes luck a problem for moral evaluation
for ironically, the existence of an omniscient God worsens the problem of
moral luck in one respect.
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There are many kinds of luck. No one denies that we do not all begin life
with the same advantages- in natural endowment, in material well-being, in
the emotional support of the family, etc .. and as life goes on those advantages
and disadvantages can change- some due to human choices, some not. It is
sometimes argued that a just society should attempt to minimize the effects
of luck by such things as aid to persons with physical or mental handicaps
or special academic programs for the disadvantaged, or programs aiming at
redistributing income. One thing is certain, however; pure luck is much easier
to accept morally than inequality that is the result of human choice or social
or economic structures over which we have some control. Helmut Schoeck
argues in his classic study on envy that the concept of luck is a socially
positive concept which mitigates the envy resulting from material or social
differences:
It is significant that concepts such as luck, chance, opportunity, 'hitting the
jackpot' - what we generally regard as someone's being undeservingly favoured by circumstances beyond his or our control- are not found in all
cultures. Indeed, in many languages there is no way of expressing such ideas.

Yet where one of these concepts exists in a society, it plays a crucial part in
controlling the problem of envy. Man can come to terms with the evident
inequality of the individual human lot, without succumbing to envy that is
destructive of both himself and others, only if he can put the responsibility
on some impersonal power-blind chance or fortune, which neither he himself nor the man favoured is able to monopolize. "Today it's the other man
who is lucky-tomorrow it may be I." We derive the same consolation from
the expression "to have bad luck." Thus what is involved is no providential
God, whose favours can be won by special zeal in worship or a pure way of
life, for this would most surely induce that bitter, consuming envy of the
"holier-than-thou" fanatic, so amply corroborated by history- as in the witch
trials, for instance. 12
Once we get past Schoeck's concluding hyperbole, we see that he has suggested an additional problem of luck for the Christian. We have already seen
that it is difficult to accept that even a portion of the grounds upon which we
are morally evaluated are beyond our control, but what is worse, we are not
even able to fall back on the idea of our moral luck as blind chance or the
luck of the draw. If there is an omniscient God it is not accurate to describe
that which we do not control as pure luck- something that is nobody's fault.
The luck described by Nagel and Feinberg occurs due to impersonal forces
that have nothing against you (or for you) personally. So if Sarah had been
born with a more naturally cheerful disposition, she would have found it much
easier to acquire the virtues of benevolence. If Mark had arrived at the
burning building a few moments earlier, he would have been the one to save
the child instead of David. If the young gang member had not been born in
poverty to a drug-addicted mother and an absent father, he would not now be
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in court faced with a string of charges from car theft to murder. In each case
there is nobody to blame for the bad luck. It just happened that way. But if
there is an omniscient God, and especially if omniscience includes a degree
of knowledge of what a person would do or would be likely to do in counterfactual circumstances, it does look as if God is picking on some people.
So moral luck for the Christian is faced with a dual problem. Not only is
there the problem identified by Nagel and magnified by the doctrines of grace
and eternal reward and punishment, but the element of luck for the Christian
is not independent of the knowledge and will of God. God permits it to go
on in full awareness of who will be morally lucky and who will be unlucky.
There is not even the consolation of luck as impersonal chance.
There is another way to look at luck, however, in which even conscious
and calculated luck in some circumstances may seem benign. Brynmor
Browne argues that luck in rewards is not nearly so bad as luck in punishments.]3 It is not as bad if some people are rewarded beyond what they control
than for some people to be punished beyond what they control, and this is at
least part of the reason that nobody complains about the existence of an
eternal heaven, while many people argue that there is something wrong with
an eternal hell. It is reasonable to say that no one has been treated unfairly
in rewards as long as each person is rewarded at least as much as she deserves.
So even if some people are rewarded more than they deserve and the reward
is not based on the luck of the draw but is consciously calculated by the
reward-giver, then there are no grounds for complaint on the part of those
who receive less. Presumably this is the moral of the Parable of the Workers
in the Vineyard.
But parallel considerations can be given for the fairness of luck in punishments. Just as there is no unfairness as long as each person is rewarded at
least as much as she deserves, we might say that there is no unfairness as
long as each person is punished no more than she deserves. In each case it
is gratuitous generosity that motivates the giver of rewards and punishments
to increase the reward or to decrease the punishment for some. Just as only
envy or spite could lead me to complain that others are the recipients of
special generosity in receiving rewards, similarly, only envy or spite could
lead me to complain that others are the recipients of special generosity in
receiving punishments. In both cases, fairness for me is determined by my
direct dealings with the laws of morality and their divine sanctions. The fact
that someone else gets special consideration should be no concern of mine.
On the model of the workers in the vineyard, we can think of my relationship
with morality as being like a contract between me, God, and the laws of
morality. What happens to other people is irrelevant to me.
This defense of the element of luck even in the case in which luck is not
blind forces us to come to terms with the issue of inequality which we have
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identified as the heart of the examples of moral and religious luck. There is
little doubt that there is something repellent about inequality to the contemporary mind, although it might be argued that this is an obsession arising
from modern political theory. But even if contemporary worries about inequality in wealth or opportunity are excessive, it hardly seems excessive to
worry about inequality in moral assessment itself, especially when the consequences are as drastic as infinite reward or punishment. Inequality of treatment by morality and by God are not easily dismissed.
But there is an even more fundamental worry that the defense of religious
luck just given overlooks. The problem of moral luck is not fundamentally a
problem about the comparison of the moral worth of one person and another,
but a comparison of the moral worth of a particular person and that same
person under different counterfactual circumstances. The bothersome inequality, then, is between one person and himself in other possible circumstances. To return to Feinberg's example, the problem is not that Hotspur is
the unlucky bearer of bad moral luck while Witwood has good moral luck,
but that Hotspur might have been Witwood. As Witwood is described by
Feinberg, he is just Hotspur's alternative self. The problem of envy which
we find in the parable of the Workers in the Vineyard does not arise on this
reading of the problem. Hotspur cannot be envious of his alternative self. He
is simply distressed that he is not that self and that the fact that he is not is
wholly beyond his control. The solution to the Christian problem of moral
luck must address the problem that Hotspur and Witwood are the same person
and it is only luck that determines that it is Hotspur that is actualized, not
Witwood.

V. Five Ways to Deal with Religious Luck
Suppose that there are true counterfactuals of freedom and that God has
Middle Knowledge. That is to say, for each person God knows what that
person would freely choose to do in every possible situation. God would then
be in a position to judge her, not just for her actual virtues and vices, the acts
she in fact performs, and their actual consequences, but for the sum total of
everything she would choose to do in every possible circumstance. Of course,
some of those circumstances exhibit bad luck, but others exhibit good luck.
It is reasonable to think, then, that luck is eliminated if her choices in the
totality of possible circumstances are the basis for her moral assessment.
Lovers of Middle Knowledge who are haters of moral luck may find this
solution attractive. Such a procedure for moral assessment would no doubt
have a levelling effect on the moral worth of human beings. After all, there
is probably some possible circumstance in which almost anybody would do
almost anything, whether it be good or bad. Whether this consequence is a
good or a bad feature of this solution, I cannot say. A feature of it that many
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would find seriously defective, though, is that it makes the actual world
meaningless as far as moral evaluation is concerned. In fact, there is really
no reason to have an actual world at all for such purposes; God might just as
well have created the beings he wanted and have gone straight on to their
final judgment, skipping the in-between step of letting a particular world
unfold. It must be admitted, then, that this approach is very far removed from
our ordinary notions of moral evaluation. But, of course, the defender of this
approach can always say that that is because our ordinary notions of moral
evaluation are permeated with elements of luck, as Williams and Nagel have
shown, and the proper response to this is to say so much the worse for our
ordinary notions of moral evaluation. So while I do not think this approach
is absurd, it should be admitted that it is radical.
A second solution is to say that a person is morally evaluated for just that
element of her character and her acts which she controls. Although Nagel
does say that when we view ourselves from the outside that portion of the
moral self that we control threatens to shrink into nothing, still, the argument
that there is moral luck does not rest on such a position, and in this paper I
have been leaving open the possibility that there is incompatibilist free will.
If so, why couldn't our moral evaluation be determined by an omniscient God
in proportion to our control?
The problem here is that it is not at all clear that there is any such thing as
the proportion of our control. Recall Joel Feinberg's conclusion to the discussion of Hotspur and Witwood. There he claims that moral responsibility
is indeterminate, not just relative to our epistemic situation, but in itself. The
precise determinability of moral responsibility is an illusion, he says; moral
responsibility is undecidable in principle. While Feinberg's argument may
not be given with the care necessary to demonstrate such a dramatic conclusion, it does at least draw our attention to the range of questions that would
have to have determinate answers if luck were to be eliminated by this move.
Not only would there need to be a determinate degree of causal control a
person has over a choice, but there would have to be a determinate degree of
control that a person has over the fact that she is in certain actual circumstances rather than in anyone of the infinite number of counterfactual circumstances. Further, there would have to be a determinate degree of her
control over the fact that she has the virtues and vices that she has. It is highly
doubtful that there is any such degree at all. And if not, even an omniscient
judge could not base his evaluation on it.
A third solution is suggested by George Schlesinger in a discussion of
divine justice. 14 The problem he addresses there is much more narrowly
focused than the one I am raising here, but the solution might be applicable.
Schlesinger is concerned about the fact that the religious beliefs requisite for
salvation are much easier for some to acquire than others. As he puts it,
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different individuals have different opportunities to avail themselves of arguments and evidence for the existence of God:
Suppose I am a non-believer who has remained unconvinced by the various
proofs for God's existence I have read or hard. There is, however, a new
argument which would appeal to me so much that it would most likely convert
me to theism. It so happens that I never get the chance to gain knowledge of
the argument and thus persist in my ungodly ways. Is it not grossly unfair
that, owing to circumstances beyond my control, I should be deprived of the
ultimate felicity I could have shared with the righteous?15
While Schlesinger puts the emphasis on the acceptance of theism based on
argument, one need not be an evidentialist to agree that whatever it takes to
believe in God is not something which everyone has an equal opportunity to
obtain. Those who grow up in a happy religious home obviously have far
greater opportunities for salvific Faith than those who grow up in deprived
circumstances in which religion is either non-existent or, perhaps even worse,
is associated in their experience with bigotry or hypocrisy. Schlesinger's
answer is that "in accordance with the pain is the reward."16 "The true amount
of virtue embodied in a given individual is not determined by the absolute
level of piety he has reached, but by the nature of the hostile circumstances
he has had to contend with in order to raise himself to the level he has
succeeded in attaining."17 So the harder it is for a person to be saved, the
greater his reward if he does his part in exhibiting a sincere good will; the
easier it is for a person to be saved, the less the reward for making a lesser
effort. So some people gamble for higher stakes with a lower chance of
success, while others gamble for lower stakes with a higher chance of success.
I have two worries about this solution. In the first place it is not at all clear
that the initial positions of the sincere person in a pagan society and the
ordinary person in religiously ideal circumstances are really equal. After all,
a real gambler has a choice between going for higher stakes with a lower
chance of winning or going for lower stakes with a higher chance of winning.
Much of what makes the game fair is that the choice is his. But in the religious
case as Schlesinger sees it, it is not up to us to choose the game we play. We
do not get to decide initially how much of a risk we want to take. Secondly,
this solution faces the same problem that infects the previous solution. Is it
even possible in principle to determine a person's chance for salvation? Is
there any such thing as the proportion of his success or failure that is due to
efforts completely under his control? What Schlesinger does not mention is
that luck in circumstances is only part of the problem. There is also luck in
those traits of character which lead some people to make the greater efforts
some need for salvation. What Schlesinger calls "a sincere good will" is itself
partly a matter of luck.
The fourth solution is to embrace a doctrine of grace according to which
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grace not only does not aggravate luck, it eliminates it. ls The idea here is that
since God desires everyone to be saved, more grace is given to the morally
unlucky. Everyone gets grace, but some get more of it to compensate for their
bad moral luck. This does seem to be what a loving parent would do. A mother
who loves all her children equally will not necessarily give each child equal
attention and help. Those who need it more, get more. On this approach it
would not be necessary for God to determine in advance a precise level of
grace needed to neutralize the effects of moral luck since God can intervene
at any time to provide more than enough grace when needed. The problem
of the indeterminacy in moral responsibility or degree of control could therefore be circumvented on this approach.
This solution seems to me to be the best so far, but the problem is that it
does not accord well with our experience. Of course it might be the case that
truly corrupted criminals such as the principal character in the recent French
film L'Elegant Criminel really did have more than enough chances to stay
on the moral path and again later to reform themselves, but it certainly does
not seem that way. What's more, an acceptance of this approach might lead
to severe harshness in our moral assessment of others. That is, it suggests
that the excuses people seem to have for their behavior are not really excuses
after all since, unseen by us (and even themselves), they had even more
opportunities for grace than most of us, but simply rejected it.
The fifth solution is that while God does not eliminate moral luck, he makes
it innocuous through universal salvation. This solution involves severing the
moral order from the order of salvation.
We have seen that Christian luck includes at least some of the kinds of luck
discussed by Nagel and Feinberg, and that it is aggravated by several aspects
of Christian doctrine. First, Christian luck is not blind, but is known in
advance to an omniscient God. Second, there is some degree of inequality in
the operation of grace. Third, and most serious of all, the doctrine of an
eternal heaven and hell magnifies the extent of moral luck to infinity. What
is most problematic in these doctrines is the way the concepts of grace,
heaven, and hell are connected with the moral institution of rewards and
punishments. Suppose, however, that there is no eternal hell. If so, we avoid
the worst problem of an infinite degree of luck in punishment, and at the
same time, an eternal heaven makes innocuous the effects of all the other
sorts of moral and religious luck we have accumulated during our earthly
existence, including inequality in the operation of grace. The fact that there
is no blind luck and all of this is known to an omniscient God is an advantage
rather than a disadvantage of this solution.
It might appear radical to sever the moral order from the order of salvation,
but notice that the Christian is already committed to this in part since Christian theology dissociates what we get from what we deserve in the case of
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heaven. When the generosity of a reward-giver is extreme enough, it is inappropriate to call his gift a reward. Heaven is not a reward, and so it is not
part of the moral order. Hell, however, is a punishment since all who go there
deserve it. Such a view requires an awkward partial break between morality
and ultimate destiny. The fifth solution to the problem of moral luck would
make a clean break between the two.
In distinguishing the moral order from the order of salvation, it is not
necessary to radically alter our moral intuitions and practices in order to deal
with moral luck, the major defect of the first solution. The solution of universal salvation does not take away luck in the moral order; moral luck simply
has no bearing on one's ultimate destiny. This means that we can accept
morality as a finite institution with finite significance, as Nagel does. If
morality requires finite punishments after death, there is nothing in this solution to prevent them from occurring. The point is that whatever the defects
of the institution of morality as we know it, that is something we can live
with as long as all is made well in eternity. A consequence of this solution is
that morality is ultimately not as important as many of us think. In any case,
it ought to be cut down to size, the only size it can realistically manage.
This solution will be attractive to those who already maintain for independent reasons that there is no eternal hell. The arguments I know of for
this conclusion almost always rest on a consideration of the divine attributes,
and the argument is that an eternal hell is inconsistent with either divine
justice, mercy, goodness, or love. My argument here is concerned only with
the problem of moral luck and the fact that the problem can be handled rather
well if there is no eternal hell. Independent arguments for the non-existence
of hell might give this solution additional support. It should be admitted,
though, that this approach does go against the dominant view in the Christian
tradition. It is mostly dependent upon a priori philosophical reasoning, but,
then, most of the other solutions are a priori as well. It is doubtful that the
problem of moral luck as I have formulated it in this paper was even considered in the tradition, so it is no surprise that there is little in the tradition of
direct relevance to the problem.19

VI. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that moral luck really is a problem and its existence
shows that common views on morality flirt with inconsistency. Some of the
sources of moral luck identified by Thomas Nagel and Joel Feinberg are
problems for Christian morality as well. Moreover, I have argued that there
are several features of Christian doctrine that magnify the problem enormously. I have gone through five solutions to the problem. All of them in one
degree or another modify traditional views about grace, heaven and hell, or
the grounds for moral evaluation. The only way I know to maintain untouched
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the traditional doctrines I have referred to in this paper requires the denial
that moral luck is a problem even when infinite rewards and punishments are
at stake. I believe this view to be deeply counter to modern moral sensibilities,
although I have not attempted to defend those sensibilities in this paper, only
to call attention to them. Furthermore, all of the solutions have problems of
their own. But in spite of this, it seems to me that if the problem of moral
luck has a solution at all, it will have to be within a theological structure
which goes beyond morality as normally discussed in the secular philosophical literature. Non-religious ethics simply does not have the resources to
handle the problem. For the purposes of this paper, I have considered only
those approaches which arise within the Christian tradition. Non-Christian
religious solutions, such as reincarnation, would also be worth considering. 20
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